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Whither and Whether with the
Formative Aim Thesis
Gopal Sreenivasan*

ABSTRACT

According to John Tasioulas, the formative aim of
internationalhuman rights law is to give effect to moral human
rights (insofar as it is appropriatefor internationallaw to do so,
through the technique of assigning a uniform set of individual
legal rights to all humans). In cases of pure human rights
inflation, an internationallegal human right fails to give effect
to any moral human right. Tasioulas regards internationallegal
human rights that fit this criterionas morally unjustified. This
Article scrutinises various bases on which the inference
underlying his conclusion might be validated and argues that
none of them succeeds. It concludes that international legal
human rights are morally independent of moral human rights.
To evaluate them properly, there is no alternative to a detailed
case by case analysis. While this analysis may include reference
to moral human rights, it is by no means limited to them and
need not include them either. Even pure cases of human rights
inflation may be morally justified.
TABLE OF CONTENTS

I.

II.

INTRODUCTION

..............................

........

1332

THE FAT...........................................

1332

IV.

AVOIDING LABELING ERRORS AND OTHER
......................................
GROUNDWORK
TASIOULAS'S RECIPE FOR CARVING DOMAINS ............

1336
1340

V.

Two DEVIATIONS FROM THE FAT......................

1343

VI.

THE MORAL DEPENDENCE THESIS.........
............
WHETHER? OR, BENTHAM FLAUNTED AND A SWEATER
.........................................
UNRAVELED

1348

III.

VII.

1350

* Gopal Sreenivasan is the Lester Crown University Professor of Ethics at Duke
University. He holds bachelor's degrees from McGill University and the University of
Oxford. He earned his Ph.D. in philosophy at the University of California, Berkeley.
Sreenivasan has published numerous articles on both rights and human rights. He is
currently at work pulling these materials together into his third book, fittingly if
unimaginatively entitled, Rights and Human Rights.

1331

VANDERBILT JOURNAL OF TRANSNATIONAL LAW

1332

VIII.

CONCLUSION...............................................

[VOL. 52:1331

1356

I. INTRODUCTION

In recent work, including in this Journal, John Tasioulas has
advanced and defended the "formative aim thesis" about international
human rights law.' According to this thesis (FAT, as he styles it),
(FAT) international human rights law is primarily concerned with giving effect
to universal moral rights, insofar as it is appropriate for international law to do
so, through the technique of assigning a uniform set of individual legal rights to
2
all human beings.

The objectives of this Article are twofold. First, to examine
Tasioulas's defence of the FAT, asking in particular what point is
served, in his view, by embracing it. It will be argued, among other
things, that the point of the FAT can only be achieved if one accepts a
further thesis, to be called the "moral dependence" thesis. Second, it
will be argued that the moral dependence thesis is false. On that basis,
this Article concludes that insofar as the FAT is committed to
something false, it should be rejected. 3 To put the conclusion more
constructively, international legal human rights have (much) greater
moral independence from moral human rights than either Tasioulas or
the FAT allow. As a result, moral evaluation of international legal
human rights can pay less attention to moral human rights than
Tasioulas and the FAT require. Indeed, in principle, it can proceed
without paying any attention to moral human rights.

II.

THE

FAT

The FAT features in two of Tasioulas's works. These works
constitute a coordinated ensemble-something like a two-step, a jab
and upper cut, or a parry and riposte, depending on whether one's
preference runs to dancing, to boxing, or to fencing. Roughly speaking,
in the earlier chapter, Tasioulas articulates the FAT and details the

1.

John Tasioulas, Exiting the Hall of Mirrors: Morality and Law in Human
&

Rights, in POLITICAL AND LEGAL APPROACHES TO HUMAN RIGHTS 73 (Tom Campbell

Kylie Bourne eds., 2018) [hereinafter Tasioulas, Morality]; John Tasioulas, Saving
Human Rights from Human Rights Law, 52 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 1167, 1168 (2019)
[hereinafter Tasioulas, Saving Human Rights].
Tasioulas, Morality, supra note 1, at 80; Tasioulas, Saving Human Rights,
2.
supra note 1, at 1174.
The qualification is to allow room for the fact, on which we shall have occasion
3.
to elaborate below, that there may nevertheless remain a sense in which the FAT is true.
But it should be rejected even if it is true in that sense.
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case for accepting it, whereas in the later Article, he wields the FAT to
criticise international human rights law. Now this is not to say that
Tasioulas's critique is a rejection of human rights law. Rather, it is a
partisan internal critique, one that attempts to save human rights law
from itself, as it were. Witness his second title.
To begin at the beginning, consider the context in which the FAT
is introduced. Tasioulas introduces his thesis in the course of some
decidedly sharp criticism of Allen Buchanan's book, The Heart of
Human Rights.4 Thus, it stands to reason that the FAT is meant to
constitute an alternative to Buchanan's approach, an alternative to the
position Buchanan rejects as well as to the one he endorses. For
present purposes, the former contrast is the more important one to
grasp. 5 Buchanan calls the position he rejects the "Mirroring View"
(MV). 6 So the first thing to understand is the difference between the

FAT and the MV.

what is primarily at issue in the Mirroring View is a conjunction of two claims:
(1) for any given right in [international human rights law] there is typically a
counterpart right in human rights morality with the same or substantively
equivalent content, and (2) that the latter right is typically either necessary or
7
sufficient to justify the enactment of the former.

.

Tasioulas discusses various formulations of the MV, but his
summary formulation runs as follows:

Following Buchanan, let the expression "corresponding moral
human right" designate a moral human right that has the same or
substantively equivalent content to a given international legal human
right (and is therefore the counterpart to that legal right, in the sense
employed in [1]).8 For example, a moral human right not to be tortured
corresponds to an international legal human right not to be tortured.
Similarly, a moral human right to be educated corresponds to an

4.

ALLEN BUCHANAN, THE HEART OF HUMAN RIGHTS (Oxford Univ. Press 2013).

&

5.
Not least because Buchanan hardly needs help from me in defending himself.
I shall accordingly neglect that aspect of the analysis in Tasioulas. See Tasioulas,
Morality, supra note 1. Still, I should perhaps declare that Buchanan and I have together
argued for a position that is similar to the one Tasioulas attacks. Allen Buchanan
Gopal Sreenivasan, Taking InternationalLegality Seriously: A Methodology for Human
Rights, in HUMAN RIGHTS: MORAL OR POLITICAL? 211-29 (Adam Etinson ed., Oxford
Univ. Press 2018). (As it happens, the publication dates of the two works belie a much
closer temporal proximity in composition). Insofar as elements of the joint work are
germane to scrutinizing the FAT, they will reappear in the text below, recalibrated
where necessary in order to adjust to the details of the present dialectic.
6.
BUCHANAN, supra note 4, at 14.
7.
Tasioulas, Morality, supra note 1, at 79.
8.
Tasioulas uses the phrase "corresponding" in the same sense. See, e.g., id. at
79-80 (quoting BUCHANAN, supranote 4, at 17, 43).
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international legal human right to free primary education. Using this
expression, the MV can be neatly synthesized as the following claim:
(1VIV) a corresponding moral human right is typically either necessary or
sufficient to justify the enactment of a given international legal human right.
9
In Tasioulas's view, the IV is "breathtakingly crude." Worse, the
10
MV represents a "straw man," so that criticism of it is simply idle.
Since Tasioulas's own position is the present concern, there is no need
to investigate the facts of how far others may or may not be committed
to the MV. One is led to expect that his FAT, at least, will be distinct
from the MV. On inspection, this expectation is borne out, as the FAT
omits both of the MV's disjuncts.
Take the MV's sufficiency disjunct first. The FAT makes no claim
that a corresponding moral human right is "typically sufficient" to
justify enactment of a given international legal human right. For while
the FAT does assert that international human rights law "aims to give
effect" to moral human rights, it also explicitly qualifies this assertion
by means of the clause, "insofar as it is appropriate for international
law to do so." 1
Tasioulas helpfully distinguishes two different ways in which it
may be inappropriate for international law to give effect to a particular
moral human right. On the one hand, it can be inappropriate if there
are principled constraints against giving (international) legal effect to
the moral right. For example, such constraints may apply to moral
rights operating in the private sphere, such as a right to a certain
distribution of domestic labour or a right to a say in major family
decisions. 12 On the other hand, giving legal effect to a particular moral
human right can also be inappropriate if there are practical constraints
against doing so. For example, legal implementation of a given moral
3
right may be counterproductive or simply ineffective.' Tasioulas's
later discussion of the case against judicialising the right to health can
also be read as illustrating these possibilities.14
Now consider the MV's necessity disjunct, according to which

(NMV) a corresponding moral human right is typically necessary to justify
enactment of a given international legal human right.

Id. at 80.
9.
10.
Id.
11.
Id.
Id. at 80, 82. The examples in the text illustrate principled constraints that
12.
cut equally against domestic or international legal implementation. Assuming there are
some matters on which states properly enjoy domestic autonomy from international law,
there may be other examples where a principled constraint against giving legal effect to
a moral human right operates solely in the realm of international law.
13. Id. at 80, 88.
14. Tasioulas, Saving Human Rights, supra note 1, at 1198-1204.
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The FAT definitely does not include the NMV either, but this is
less straightforward because the explanation does not turn on any part
of the FAT's explicit content. Rather, it has to do with an interaction
between the terms "typically" and "corresponding" in the NMV.
Tasioulas borrows the qualification "typically" from Buchanan, who
uses it to acknowledge that some proponents of the MV freely accept
two exceptions to the unqualified versions of the MV's claims.

15

In all

of the cases envisaged, the justification of a justified international legal
human right remains anchored in some fashion in a moral human
right. Occasionally, however, the anchoring moral human right does
not correspond to the legal right. That is to say, the contents of the two
rights are not substantively equivalent.
In one kind of case, the justified legal right (further) specifies the
moral right, as opposed to more or less reproducing its content.
Buchanan's example is a legal right to freedom of the press, where the
anchor for its justification is taken to be the moral right to freedom of
expression. 16 In the other kind of case, the relation between the two
rights is even looser. More specifically, the justificatory tie between the
two rights is purely instrumental, so that there need be no particular
conceptual connection between their respective contents. Buchanan's
example is an international legal human right to democratic
government, which is taken to be justified on the basis of its
instrumental efficacy in realising some moral human rights or otherthe moral human rights not to be tortured and not to be arbitrarily
imprisoned, 17 say-all on the assumption that there is no moral
human right to democratic government. 18
Each of these kinds of cases describes a situation in which an
international legal human right is justified, and its justification is
anchored in a moral human right, but the moral right does not
"correspond" to the legal right. Hence, both represent cases in which a
corresponding moral human right is not necessary to justify some
(justified) international legal human right. They therefore flout the
rule that the NMV claims to govern the relationship between moral
human rights and justified international legal human rights.
However, neither case constitutes a counterexample to the NMV. For
the NMV has been judiciously crafted and merely claims that its rule
holds "typically," not that it holds without exception.

15.

Tasioulas, Morality, supra note 1, at 79 (quoting BUCHANAN, supra note 4, at

17).
16.
BUCHANAN, supra note 4, at 17.
17.
Thomas Christiano, An Instrumental Argument for a Human Right to
Democracy, 39 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 142, 145 (2011). Christiano himself argues for a moral
human right to democracy, rather than an international legal human right. But I am
only borrowing his examples and am not invoking or endorsing his argument here.
18.
BUCHANAN, supra note 4, at 17.

1336

VANDERBILT JOURNAL OFTRANSNATIONAL LAW

[VOL. 52:1331

The disagreement between the NMV and the FAT centres on the
question of how "exceptional" these two kinds of flouting cases are.
According to the NMV, they must be very exceptional. After all, what
the NMV claims is that its rule is "typically" satisfied, and this
evidently excludes widespread exceptions. By contrast, Tasioulas
suggests that these exceptions are much more common than the NMV
allows. Or, more cautiously: "It is entirely possible, for example, that
rather than being 'exceptions,' the phenomena of specification and
instrumentalization extensively characterize the proper relationship
between these two bodies of norms."19 His FAT, then, does not so much
pronounce explicitly on this question as it simply omits to commit itself
to the restriction that is built into the NMV. Unlike the NMV,
therefore, the FAT is perfectly consistent with the possibility that
specification and instrumentalization are indispensable to the
justification of many international legal human rights.

III. AVOIDING LABELING ERRORS AND OTHER GROUNDWORK

Before turning to consider the basis on which Tasioulas affirms
the FAT, it will be useful to clarify four preliminary points. To begin
with, the NMV is not simply about the relationship between moral
human rights and international legal human rights. What is at issue,
more specifically, is the relationship between moral human rights and
the moral justification of international legal human rights. 20 Unlike
with moral rights, being justified is not built into the existence
conditions of legal rights. There is no incoherence in a legal right's
existing-or, for that matter, even being validly enforced-despite not
being morally justified. Likewise, there is no incoherence in a legal
right's not existing, even where it is morally justified to enact it.
Tasioulas sometimes writes as if the question concerned the
relationship between moral human rights and the (mere) existence of
international legal human rights, 2 1 but these are better treated as
slips.
Further to this point, a legal right's being justified is actually an
ongoing proposition, which is not limited to whether the right is or was
justified to enact in the first place. Nor does the fact that a legal right
was justifiably enacted suffice to establish that the right is justified
now, though it does contribute significantly to that conclusion. Facts

19.
Tasioulas, Morality, supranote 1, at 80.
20.
The same goes for the MV itself. But for reasons that will become clear, we
will really only be interested in the NMV in what follows. Throughout this Article,
"justification" means moral justification.
21.
For example, "[n]or is there a compelling basis for pinning on orthodox
theorists the thesis that enacting an international legal right requires, as a necessary
condition, the existence of a background moral human right with broadly matching
content." Id.
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change. So a legal right that once was justified may later become
unjustified. The MV and the NMV refer narrowly to justifying
"enactment" only because they were fashioned to recapitulate passages
from Tasioulas.
Next, any discussion of the relationship between moral human
rights and international legal human rights obviously presupposes
some distinction between them. 22 Even if the general distinction
between moral rights and legal rights is taken for granted, this will
only cover part of the analytical work that needs to be done. A very
substantial, and controversial, question still remains about what
makes some moral rights (and not others) human rights in particular;
and likewise, with some international legal rights (and not others). For
many contributors to the philosophical literature on human rights, this
is the question (or at least, the bit about moral rights is). 23
This Article will not attempt to engage that enormous
controversy, though it will not be possible to avoid making some
assumptions about it. Instead two very important points will be
registered here. They stand to the side of what is elsewhere the main
controversy, but are highly germane to the discussion to follow. First,
it is not compulsory to employ exactly the same criteria to mark legal
human rights off from other legal rights as one employs to mark moral
human rights off from other moral rights. Alternatively, it is not
compulsory to answer "the" controversial question exactly the same
way for the two realms of rights, moral and legal.
One option is to mark the distinction in purely structural terms,
while leaving material differences between the two realms of rights in
place. For example, human rights could be distinguished from other
rights, in both cases, simply through being universally distributed (i.e.,
every individual has them),2 4 even though universal legal rights are
still not moral rights. A criterion of universal distribution suffices to
disqualify some international legal rights held by individuals from
being human rights. For example, it disqualifies rights to immunity
from prosecution held by diplomats.25 Another option is to embrace
nominalism for the legal case, while adopting some substantive
criterion for the moral case. According to nominalism, legal human

22.

Buchanan

devotes

considerable

attention

to the

significance

of this

distinction. See BUCHANAN, supra note 4.

23.

For example, see the various contributions to HUMAN RIGHTS: MORAL OR

POLITICAL?, supra note 5, at Part II.

24.
This is one respect in which Tasioulas explicitly accepts that international
legal human rights do "mirror" moral human rights. Tasioulas, Morality, supra note 1,
at 80-81.
25. Andrea Sangiovanni, Are Moral Rights Necessary for the Justification of
InternationalLegal Rights?, 30 ETHICS & INT'L AFF. 471, 475-76 (2016) (Sangiovanni
uses the example for a different purpose, indeed one inconsistent from mine).
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rights are just whatever legal rights are called "human rights" in some
valid law (e.g., some valid international treaty). 26 As things stand,
nominalism also happens to entail that international legal human
rights are universally distributed. But this result is not guaranteed
under nominalism.
Second, if anything other than nominalism is adopted for the legal
case, the possibility arises that international human rights law may
contain what might be called "labeling errors." Crucially, such labeling
errors introduce an ambiguity in otherwise straightforward attempts
27
to ask about the justification of international legal human rights.
This ambiguity will be most consequential where one's criterion for
what makes a legal right a human right just is "gives effect to some
moral human right." 28 To illustrate, consider Raz's example of the
29
international legal human right to adequate housing. For the sake of
argument, assume that there is no moral human right to adequate
housing and that this legal right serves no other moral human right
either. On the aforementioned criterion, it follows that there is no
international legal human right to adequate housing. While Article
11(1) of the International Covenant for Economic, Social and Cultural
Rights (ICESCR) does indeed create a valid international legal right to
30
adequate housing, this right does not count as a human right. Since
the ICESCR nevertheless calls this right a human right, it contains a
labeling error.
Is the international legal human right to adequate housing
morally justified? Unfortunately, this question now turns out to be
ambiguous as between two possibilities. 3 ' One possibility is that it
means: Is Article 11(1) of the ICESCR morally justified? The other

In our joint paper, Buchanan and I adopt this expedient for international
26.
legal human rights. We did so as a matter of convenience, rather than as a principled
position. Buchanan & Sreenivasan, supra note 5.
Insofar as one is interested in focusing on this very question, that is precisely
27.
a reason to adopt nominalism for the legal case.
But labeling error (and therefore, ambiguity) can arise even when one's
28.
criterion is the apparently anodyne structural requirement that a legal right must be
universally distributed in order to count as a human right. As far as I know, no existing
international treaty creates a labeling error under this criterion, at least not for
individual human rights. But, in principle, nothing prevents a future treaty from
assigning an international legal right it calls a "human right" to a subset of individuals
world-wide, in contravention of the anodyne criterion.
Joseph Raz, On Waldron's Critique of Raz, in HUMAN RIGHTS: MORAL OR
29.
POLITICAL?, supra note 5, at 141. As Raz observes, this is recognized as a human right
as part of Article 11(1) of the International Covenant for Economic, Social and Cultural
Rights (ICESCR). International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Dec.
16, 1966, 993 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter ICESCR].
Raz, supra note 29, at 141.
30.
Of course, there are really more than two ways of dividing up the possibilities.
31.
But the important point is that they all fall into two groups, one in which the labeling
error does not get in the way of a sensible question and another in which it does. The
possibilities described in the text can be seen as simply illustrating the respective groups.
However, neither group leaves one in a good position.
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possibility is that it means: Is the international legal right that is both
a right to adequate housing and a human right morally justified?
Insofar as "giving effect to some moral human right" is a necessary
condition of any legal right's counting as a human right, the original
question cannot be answered on either interpretation. Consider the
first interpretation first. By hypothesis, Article 11(1) is not a human
right. So discovering whether Article 11(1) is justified will not answer
the question of whether the international legal human right to
adequate housing is morally justified. Now consider the second
interpretation. There is no legal right that is both a right to adequate
housing and a human right (again, by hypothesis). This version of the
question therefore has no answer at all because it fails to refer.
It may now be easier to appreciate the force of the previous point.
Its force is that it is certainly possible to avoid being prevented from
answering questions about the justification of international legal
human rights that have been labeled in error. In particular, this
predicament can be avoided no matter what the correct criteria are for
distinguishing moral human rights from other moral rights. Suppose
Tasioulas is correct, for example. In his view, "[moral] human rights
are moral rights possessed by all human beings simply in virtue of
their humanity (and discoverable through ordinary moral
reasoning)." 32 If his account for the moral case is paired with
nominalism for the legal case, the possibility of labeling errors in
international human rights law is excluded altogether. Both the
ambiguities these errors introduce and the predicament associated
with them are thereby avoided.
This Article shall assume that one should be able to answer
questions about the moral justification of international legal rights like
Article 11(1) of the ICESCR-even, that is, under the assumption that
it does not give effect to any moral human right-and that an analysis
of human rights should be helpful in this endeavor.3 3 Depending on

32.
Tasioulas, Morality, supra note 1, at 74.
33.
Somewhat perversely, there is one advantage to not being able to answer
questions about the moral justification of international legal human rights that have
been labelled in error. Namely, if our analysis makes "giving effect to some moral human
right" a necessary condition both of an international legal right's being a human right
and of its being morally justified, that analysis will be immune to counter-examples on
the model of Article 11(1) when the legal rights in question are described as human
rights. Since putative counter-examples to the second claim (about the legal rights being
morally justified) will also necessarily involve a labeling error, the question itself will
fail to refer (and so its non-answer cannot count against the analysis). However, since
this "advantage" comes at the evident cost of disabling the analysis from answering the
very question at issue, I would not have guessed that anyone would be tempted to reach
for it. But it seems that I am wrong about that. See Erasmus Mayr, Instrumentalismand
Human Rights: A Response to Buchanan and Sreenivasan, in HUMAN RIGHTS: MORAL OR
POLITICAL?, supra note 5, at 230-37; Sangiovanni, supra note 25 (tying the conditions
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what the truth is about the substance and the extent of moral human
rights, many international legal human rights will at least be
vulnerable to falling into the category of "labelled in error" if the
criteria for legal rights tie the label "human right" to some moral
human right. If nominalism for the legal case seems too promiscuous,
the structural criterion of universal distribution-every individual has
the right-can still succeed in excluding labeling errors for
international human rights law, at least as it presently exists. Since
this criterion is also more congenial to Tasioulas's position, this Article
34
will adopt it.

Finally, and perhaps most importantly of all, even if Article 11(1)
of the ICESCR has been labeled in error, it does not follow that Article
11(1) is morally unjustified.3 5 Of course, if it has been labeled as a
human right in error, it follows trivially that Article 11(1) is not
justified as a human right. 36 Similarly, if there has been a labeling
error, that presumably counts for something against Article 11(l)'s
being a morally justified legal right. However, after all of that, one still
has to consider what counts in favour of Article 11(1)'s being a justified
legal right, as well as where the balance of considerations on all sides
lies. Hence, notwithstanding the labeling error, the question of
whether Article 11(1) is morally justified is still open and very much in
need of separate evaluation.

IV. TASIOuLAS's RECIPE FOR CARVING DOMAINS
Tasioulas's case for accepting the FAT has two main planks in it.
In fact, his case is perhaps better described as a "recipe for a case," but
it will still be useful to discern the structure of the recipe.
His first plank is that the FAT belongs to the "long-established
self-understanding" of the participants in the practice of human
rights. 3 7 As evidence for this, Tasioulas adduces an aspect of the

under which international legal human rights are justified to the conditions under which
international legal rights are correctly labeled as human rights).
In principle, it would be relevant to object that by restricting the options for
34.
how to distinguish legal human rights from other legal rights to nominal, structural, or
moral criteria, our discussion omits functional criteria and therefore unduly prejudices
matters against "political" accounts of human rights. This might be damaging in another
context. However, since Tasioulas rejects political accounts, he is no position to press
this point. A somewhat weightier version of this objection will recur in Part VII below,
which discusses moral justification instead of labeling.
Raz explicitly accepts this proposition. Indeed, it is part of the point he makes
35.
with the example. Raz, supra note 29, at 141-42. For that matter, Mayr accepts it too.
Mayr, supra note 33, at 231-32.
But then again, it follows equally that it is not unjustified "as" a human right.
36.
It is not anything as a human right because (by hypothesis) it is not a human right. We
could make the same points about what follows from Article 11(l)'s being erroneously
labeled as a "can of soup."
Tasioulas, Morality, supra note 1, at 83.
37.
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history of Article 27 of the Universal Declaration on Human Rights. 38
In this connection, it bears mention that one of Tasioulas's disputes
with Buchanan concerns how central international human rights law
is to the explanandum of a theory of human rights.39 It is not clear
whether the place that Tasioulas claims for the FAT in the selfunderstanding of the practice is meant to be something that can be
established in relation to international human rights law alone or
whether this plank turns somehow on accepting his own wider
understanding of human rights practice (i.e., of where its centre lies).
By contrast, Tasioulas's second plank is clearly intended to be
simply a matter of how best to interpret international law. It holds that
the FAT provides international human rights law with "its coherence
as a domain within public international law, distinguishing it in a
principled way from other domains of law, such as humanitarian law,
the law of the sea, and so on." 40 Tasioulas recognises that other areas
of international law also "give effect" to moral human rights. 4 1 What
distinguishes international human rights law from other areas,
however, is that giving effect to moral human rights is its primary goal
and that it accomplishes this goal via a "distinctive technique," namely;
by "assigning a uniform set of individual legal rights to all human
42
beings."
To reinforce this plank, which seems to be the more important of
the two, Tasioulas offers an analogy to municipal law. 4 3 Although his
analogy is grounded in plural examples, one illustration will suffice for
present purposes. Following Charles Fried, Tasioulas observes that the
moral notion of a promise serves as the "core organizing idea" of
contract law. 44 Contract law, in other words, can be distinguished fron
other domains of municipal law-from restitution and tort, say-by
reference to "its primary aim of recognizing and giving effect to certain
promises that are apt for legal enforcement." 4 5 Thus, Tasioulas's
suggestion is that moral human rights play the same organising role
for international human rights law that promises play for contract law.
If it succeeds, what the municipal analogy demonstrates is that
there is an established role-namely, that of "core organizing idea"-

38.
Id. at 82. The distinction between the planks, as I am calling them, as well as
the specific association of this anecdote with the first plank, is even clearer in Tasioulas's
Article. See Tasioulas, Saving Human Rights, supra note 1, at 1176-77.
39.
Tasioulas thinks that Buchanan exaggerates its centrality. See Tasioulas,
Morality, supra note 1, at 78.
40. Id. at 80.
41. Id.
42.
Id.
43.
Id. at 81.
Id. (citing CHARLES FRIED, CONTRACT AS PROMISE (2d ed., Oxford Univ. Press
44.
2015)).
45.
Tasioulas, Morality, supra note 1, at 81.
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for moral human rights to play in relation to international human
rights law. Moreover, if moral human rights do play this role, then the
FAT is correct. For all the FAT says, more or less, is that they play that
role. However, the municipal analogy itself is silent-for example, the
facts about the organisation of contract law are silent--on the pivotal
question of whether moral human rights do play that organising role
for international human rights law. Nothing else Tasioulas supplies in
"Exiting the Hall of Mirrors" constitutes evidence on that score either.
That is why his discussion in that chapter is better seen as a recipe for
a case.
To follow through on this recipe, and secure an actual case for the
FAT, would require drilling down into the details of international
human rights law, as well as some comparison with alternative bases
on which international human rights law might be distinguished as a
distinctive domain of public international law. For it is not really
enough even to show that the FAT is adequate to the task of
distinguishing the relevant domain of international law. What has to
be shown, further, is that the FAT is also better than the alternatives.
Since the FAT itself comprises at least two distinct components, a
particularly salient alternative with which it needs to be compared is
a stripped-down version of itself. If, for example, simple reliance on the
"distinctive technique" of assigning a uniform set of individual legal
rights to all human beings were just as good at distinguishing
international human rights law from other domains of public
international law-just as good, that is, as the full-blown FAT-then
the case for its additional component would fall away. But its
"additional" component, of course, is precisely the goal of giving effect
to moral human rights (insofar as it is appropriate for international
law to do so).46 Hence this comparison is of some consequence.
In what remains, and for the sake of argument, this Article shall
nevertheless treat the case for the FAT as having already been made
out. It will thus pivot from Tasioulas's parry to his riposte. This means
shifting attention from his previous chapter to his present Article. The
question therefore becomes: to what end is the FAT supposed to be
accepted? Whither the FAT?

In principle, we should distinguish the claim that international human rights
46.
law has this goal from the claim that it is the primary goal. Thus, the FAT really has
three components, and it is the third component (primary goal) that seems to do a lot of
the work. By the same logic, this third component also has to be shown to outperform
the alternative constituted by the other two.
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V. Two DEVIATIONS FROM THE FAT

A central theme of Tasioulas's Article in this Journal is that
international human rights law has strayed or deviated from its
formative purpose, as identified by the FAT. 4 7 It has strayed, that is
to say, from its purpose of giving effect to moral human rights, insofar
as it is appropriate for international law to do so. Indeed, it has
deviated in a number of respects. While Tasioulas concentrates on two
specific kinds of deviation, it is clear that these are only meant to be
examples standing in for an open-ended list. 48 For the most part, this
Article shall concentrate on Tasioulas's first example. But it will be
helpful to begin with the second.
In general terms, Tasioulas's second example is the tendency of
international human rights law to overlegalise-and even more, to
overjudicialise-moral human rights. Here the feature of the FAT from
which international law deviates is its proviso, "insofar as it is
appropriate for international law to do so." As articulated in Part II,
this proviso prevents any moral human right from operating as a
sufficient condition of justifying an international legal human right.
More specifically, the proviso prevents this by imposing, in effect, two
additional necessary conditions on justifying any particular
international legal human right. These correspond to the principled
and the practical constraints distinguished earlier, contravention of
which makes it "inappropriate" to give legal effect to a given moral
human right, however important that moral right may otherwise be.
By way of illustration, consider Tasioulas's discussion of the
judicialisation of the international legal human right to health. 4 9 For
concreteness, he focuses on "the relatively strong form according to
which a right is justiciable if its possessor is empowered to seek their
entitlements under the right in question to be granted to them by
means of a judicial decision upholding that right." so Tasioulas
identifies four limitations on making the legal right to health
"justiciable" in this sense. 51 Of these, the second limitation most
clearly embodies his practicality constraint, since it holds that
"enabling litigants to claim their entitlements under those rights in
court may be counterproductive so far as overall compliance with
human rights is concerned." 52 As examples of contraventions of this
constraint, Tasioulas adduces the cases of Brazil and Colombia, where

47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.

Tasioulas, Saving Human Rights, supra note 1, at 1169.
Id. at 1178-79.
Id. at 1203-04.
Id. at 1202.
Id. at 1203-06.
Id. at 1204.
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there is a strongly justiciable constitutional right to health; and where,
been
indeed
effects have
his citations suggest, the
so
counterproductive.
Prospectively, the immediate conclusion that follows, on
Tasioulas's analysis, is that the moral human right to health should
not be made strongly justiciable in cases where the second limitation
applies. Retrospectively, what follows immediately is that the
constitutional rights to health in Brazil and Colombia, which have
already been made strongly justiciable (against the second limitation),
are not morally justified. In each case, the argument for this conclusion
is that the legal right to health in question fails a necessary condition
on its moral justification. A subsequent conclusion, for the
retrospective cases, is that international human rights law should be
reformed, to "[bring] it into greater alignment with the human rights
morality it is supposed to advance." 54 Finally, Tasioulas goes on to
speculate that excessive deviations from the FAT "may help to explain
some of the popular backlash encountered by [international human
55
rights law]."

The point served by accepting the FAT is therefore clear: The
FAT provides a licence to evaluate international human rights law and
thence, to reform it. Elsewhere Tasioulas describes the FAT as the
"governing rationale" of international human rights law and "the
starting point for [his] rescue operation" (viz., of saving international
human rights law from itself).5 6 Examining his second example of a
deviation from the FAT also clarifies how this licence works, namely,
by articulating and applying necessary conditions on the moral
justification of international legal human rights. In any case, that is
how Tasioulas secures his immediate conclusion that a strongly
justiciable international legal human right to health is not morally
justified. He acknowledges, of course, that fully executing his reform
project "requires mobilising many different forms of expertise," going
well beyond philosophy. 57 For present purposes, though, his
immediate conclusion, representing his philosophical contribution to
the reform, is all that matters.
Now, in principle, Tasioulas's analysis works the same way with
his first example, which centres on the failure of international human

53.
Tasioulas cites Octavio Ferraz, Health Inequalities, Rights, and Courts: The
Social Impact of the "Judicializationof Health"inBrazil, in LITIGATING HEALTH RIGHTS:
CAN COURTS BRING MORE JUSTICE TO HEALTH? (Alicia Yamin & Siri Gloppen eds., Harv.

Univ. Press 2011); David Landau, The Reality of Social Rights Enforcement, 53 HARV.
INT'L L.J. 189 (2012).
54.
Tasioulas, Saving Human Rights, supranote 1, at 1173. Later in the Article,
he makes the same point in different language, by urging us to "discipline [international
human rights law] in line with the FAT." Id. at 1191.
55.
Id. at 1178.
Id. at 1169, 1207.
56.
Id. at 1173.
57.
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rights law consistently to observe the distinction between universal
moral rights and universal human interests or values. That
distinction, in turn, rests on the "fact that moral rights are associated
with obligations," whereas interests or values (even universal ones) are
not necessarily so associated. 58 What emerges in cases where
international human rights law collapses this distinction, he argues, is
"human rights inflation." 5 9 In other words, what emerges are other
cases where an international legal human right is not justified. The
purest specific examples Tasioulas offers of this first kind of deviation
from the FAT are the international legal human rights to annual paid
leave, to internet access, and to same-sex marriage. 60
With both kinds of deviation from the FAT, then, there are cases
where an international legal human right is not morally justified.
However, there is still a significant difference between the two
examples. As this Article has already shown, the licence to evaluate
the second example (overjudicialisation) derives from the FAT's
proviso on appropriate legalisation. But any licence to evaluate the
first example (rights inflation) must derive from something else. That
is because what the proviso's necessary conditions (e.g., the practicality
constraint) are conditions on is the appropriateness of giving legal
effect to a moral human right. Hence, they presuppose that there is a
moral human right to which the international legal right being
evaluated gives effect. By contrast, what is characteristic of the pure
rights inflation cases is precisely that there is no moral human right to
which they (e.g., the legal right to annual paid leave) give effect, 61 but
merely a human interest. That, recall, is why Tasioulas objects to
them.

58.
Id. at 1179.
59.
Id. at 1181.
60.
Id. at 1178. The other specific example Tasioulas provides concerns the scope
of the international legal human right to health. In the next note, I shall explain why
this is an impure example. But in calling it impure, I do not mean to be objecting to it.
As a separate matter, the right to health example is inherently messy; and Tasioulas
and I also disagree about many of its details. It therefore seems better-certainly, it will
be cleaner-to leave it to the side here.
61.
What makes the health case an impure example, at least for Tasioulas, is the
fact that he fully accepts that there is a moral human right to health, even if its scope is
narrower (or less "bloated") than that of the international legal right. Id. at 1186. This
both tempers the extent to which he finds the international legal human right to health
to be unjustified and arguably makes this case an instance of his second deviation rather
than his first. Both kinds of deviation from the FAT represent cases where international
human rights law "overdoes it" with respect to moral human rights. In that sense, they
are both kinds of inflation. But, as I understand it, what characterizes the second
example is that, there, international human rights law inflates from a little something
to a lot, whereas in the first example it inflates from nothing to something. Notice, in
any case, that the international legal human right to health features as an illustration
of both deviations in Tasioulas's text.
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consider Tasioulas's example of the
For concreteness,
62
international legal human right to annual paid leave. To advertise
its status as a case of pure "rights inflation," assume that there is no
moral human right to annual paid leave and that this international
legal right serves no other moral human right. These stipulations
parallel those made in discussing Raz's example of the international
legal human right to adequate housing. According to Tasioulas, the
international legal human right to annual paid leave is not morally
justified.6 3 But where does the licence for his evaluation originate?
This Article's claim is that this licence has to originate from
outside of the FAT. There are two obstacles to locating it within the
FAT. One is superficial, but nevertheless striking, and the other is
simply decisive. Consider them in order. On the face of it, neither the
creation of an international legal human right to annual paid leave nor
the claim that this right is morally justified actually contradicts the
FAT at all; and not simply because it is only one right (and so can fall
within any margin of error). 64 Of course, by hypothesis, this
international legal right does not give effect to any moral human right
and therefore does nothing to advance the primary aim of international
human rights law, as identified by the FAT. Presumably, however,
international human rights law can also have secondary aims-the
FAT's explicit language of "primary" aim seems to permit them.
Moreover, there is nothing exclusive in the formulation of the primary
aim itself. As a result, there remains a very important difference
between "failing to make contact" with that primary aim and
"contradicting" it. Somewhat surprisingly, then, there seems to be
nothing in the FAT to license the conclusion that the international
65
legal human right to annual paid leave is not justified.
Naturally, this lacuna could always be remedied by reformulating
the FAT. For example, perhaps the FAT would be improved if it were
amended to say that giving effect to moral human rights is the sole
independent aim of international human rights law, which would
contradict claims that some international legal human right that had
been inflated ex nihilo was morally justified. Or perhaps that is what

See ICESCR, supranote 29, at art. 7(d).
62.
Tasioulas, Saving Human Rights, supra note 1, at 1178.
63.
There is no mention in the FAT of any margin of error (akin to the "typically"
64.
in the NMV). But in both the contract law and criminal law examples developed as part
of Tasioulas's municipal analogy, there is not only explicit permission for some deviation
from the core organising idea, but also explicit tolerance for extending the relevant
domain on the basis of extraneous materials (e.g., economic considerations in contract
law). So perhaps, by analogy, the FAT countenances a margin of error after all. See
Tasioulas, Morality, supra note 1, at 81-82.
If one took Tasioulas's speculative backlash hypothesis very seriously, there
65.
might be room to construct an instrumental argument against the international legal
human right to annual paid leave, based on the negative effects of the backlash on the
general enterprise of human rights, at least if these rose to the level of jeopardizing the
primary aim of international human rights law.
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Tasioulas meant all along. Either is certainly possible. Unfortunately,
this strategy-changing things up some-only foreshadows the
decisive obstacle.
Unlike the superficial obstacle, the decisive obstacle has to do with
Tasioulas's case for the FAT, rather than the content of his thesis per
se. Tasioulas's case is purely descriptive. Its two planks describe,
respectively, the historical self-understanding of the participants in
the practice of human rights and the contours or shape of a certain
domain of public international law. Insofar as these planks are
accurate, they establish that the FAT is a descriptive truth.
Ultimately, however, the FAT plays a normative role in
Tasioulas's argument. It serves to license evaluations of international
human rights law-for example, to license the conclusion that the
international legal human right to annual paid leave is not morally
justified. 66 No purely descriptive case is adequate to that task. Either
the FAT itself has some evaluative content, which Tasioulas's case does
not reach, or it has no evaluative content, in which case the FAT is ill
suited to its role (however adequate Tasioulas's case may be to the
FAT). In each case, though, there is a gap between Tasioulas's case for
the FAT and its normative role. That is the decisive obstacle to locating
the relevant licences in the FAT.
It may help to spell this point out. Return to the overjudicialisation example, since there the letter of the FAT as written
does lay down a necessary condition (in the form of the practicality
constraint) that a strongly justiciable right to health fails. 67 The first
plank of Tasioulas's case for the FAT entails that a strongly justiciable
right to health contravenes the participants' historical selfunderstanding of the primary aim of international human rights law.
But absent some ground to affirm that this self-understanding should
not change and should "not be eschewed," it does not follow that a
strongly justiciable right to health is not justified. 68 Likewise,
Tasioulas's second plank entails that a strongly justiciable right to
health undermines the distinctive shape that international human
rights law has as a domain of public international law, and, at the
limit, leads to its ceasing to be a distinctive domain of international
law at all. Again, however, absent some ground to affirm that
international human rights law should remain a distinctive domain of

66.
Tasioulas, Saving Human Rights, supra note 1, at 1178.
67.
As an incidental merit, this will also make clear that the decisive obstacle
applies equally to the FAT's ability to license evaluations of the second kind of deviation
Tasioulas discusses.
68.
See Part II of Tasioulas, Saving Human Rights, supra note 1, at 1173
subtitled, "The Formative Aim of International Human Rights Law: or, Not Eschewing
the FAT."
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public international law, it does not follow that a strongly justiciable
69
right to health is not justified.

VI.

THE MORAL DEPENDENCE THESIS

This Article will now introduce the moral dependence thesis
(MDT). According to this thesis,
(MDT) it is a necessary condition on the moral justification of a given
international legal human right that it be suitably related to some moral human
right.

70

Unlike the FAT, the MDT clearly licenses Tasioulas's conclusion
that the international legal human right to annual paid leave is
morally unjustified, at least under the previous stipulations. For under
those stipulations, there is no moral human right served by this
international legal right. 7 ' Hence, it fails a necessary condition on its
moral justification.
Of course, the MDT has merely been stated here and no case has
been provided for it, whereas Tasioulas did mount a case for the FAT.
So perhaps it would be more judicious to say that the MDT clearly
entails that the international legal human right to annual paid leave
is morally unjustified. In this way, the MDT does for pure rights
inflation cases (first deviation) exactly what the FAT does for
overjudicialisation cases (second deviation); and even does it by the
same mechanism, namely, by articulating a necessary condition on the
moral justification of international legal human rights, a necessary
condition the cases in question fail. To turn either of these necessary
conditions into a true licence to evaluate international human rights
law, one would have to argue for it properly.
This Article will not mount any case for the MDT, not least
because it will later argue that the MDT is false. But that does not
really matter here, since the more judicious statement is fully adequate
for present purposes, which are to suggest that Tasioulas's analysis of

Strictly speaking, what is required is not simply grounds to affirm that
69.
international human rights law should be a distinctive domain of international law, but
grounds to affirm that it should remain a distinctive domain with its present shape.
Otherwise, the possibility remains open that international human rights law can be
reconstituted as a different distinctive domain of international law, albeit one that now
includes a (perfectly justified) strongly justiciable right to health.
At the conference in Nashville, and in homage to Chow-Yun Fat, I called this
70.
thesis the "hidden dragon" thesis. But in writing I have presumed that a more sober
sobriquet is in order.
Recall that this is the characteristic feature of what I have been calling cases
71.
of pure rights inflation. The right to annual paid leave is just a representative example,
borrowed from Tasioulas. Tasioulas, Saving Human Rights, supra note 1, at 1178.
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human rights commits him to the MDT, as a supplement to the FAT. 72
The argument for this attribution is very simple. It is that the MDT
entails a conclusion that Tasioulas affirms and for which he needs an
argument that his own FAT does not supply. The general form of the
relevant conclusion is that cases of pure rights inflation are not morally
justified (e.g., the international legal human right to annual paid leave
is not). Alternatively, the MDT gives Tasioulas an argument that he
needs and which he would otherwise lack. 7
Before turning to argue against the MDT, though, it will be
instructive to compare it briefly to the NMV, which Tasioulas explicitly
rejects. 74 As a reminder, the rejected thesis holds that
(NMV) a corresponding moral human right is typically necessary to justify
enactment of a given international legal human right.

Both the MDT and the NMV articulate necessary conditions on the
justification of international legal human rights; and both are well
suited, unlike the FAT, to evaluating pure rights inflation cases.
Unlike the NMV, the MDT does not restrict its necessary condition to
corresponding moral human rights. Any moral human right that
stands in some justificatory relation to the international legal human
right being evaluated will do. The MDT does not try to limit, or even to
specify, what these justificatory relations might be. As argued in Part
II, the NMV's correspondence requirement was the basis on which
Tasioulas rejected it. To this end, he adduces cases in which an
international legal human right's justificatory relation to a moral
human right is specificatory or instrumental, neither of which relation
involves a corresponding moral human right. In all of these cases,
however, the justification of a justified international legal human right
remains anchored in some moral human right or other.7 5 All of these
cases therefore satisfy the MDT perfectly well.
Furthermore, and again unlike the NMV, the MDT does not
include the margin of error qualification "typically." It could always be
revised to include one, if this were somehow found to be important. But
it is worth observing that while such qualifications may be useful for
evading counterexamples, they also come at a cost. Sophistication is a

72.
This supplement serves to cover the first deviation, leaving the second
deviation to be covered by the FAT. Thus, the MDT is not to replace the FAT.
73.
In the background here is an assumption on my part that no other
supplements to the FAT are available to Tasioulas, besides the MDT.
74.
Tasioulas, Morality, supra note 1, at 79-80.
75.
More generally, all the cases Tasioulas adduces in rejecting the NMV for
himself fit this pattern. See, e.g., Tasioulas, Morality, supra note 1, at 88 n.23; see also
Tasioulas, Saving Human Rights, supra note 1, at 1185 (describing moral human rights
as the "normative roots" of international legal human rights).
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double-edged sword. For example, unlike the MDT, the NMV does not
entail that the international legal human right to annual paid leave is
unjustified, not even under our stipulation that there is no moral
human right to annual paid leave (i.e., there is no corresponding moral
human right). Before that conclusion can be drawn, an extra step is
required, in which it has to be shown that the case at hand falls outside
the margin of error introduced by "typically." Among other things, this
means that to wield the NMV, one has to have some reasonable sense
of where the boundaries of its margin of error lie. Without that, the
NMV is not a very useful guide to the evaluation of international
human rights law.

VII. WHETHER? OR, BENTHAM FLAUNTED AND A SWEATER UNRAVELED

This Article advances two arguments against the MDT, one in its
own right and another in Jeremy Bentham's. 76 The Benthamite
argument departs from a premise this Article does not endorse but will
nevertheless be enlightening to discuss. Bentham famously and very
colourfully rejects the existence of any moral rights.7 7 Rights, he held,
are children of the law and of the law alone. "There are no rights
without law." 78 Thus, in his view, a moral right-or, indeed, any
nonlegal right-is a contradiction in terms: a "son that never had a
father" or, even better, a "sort of dry moisture."7 9 For convenience, the
relevant entailment of his position can be regimented as
(B) there are no moral human rights.
While this Article does not accept (B), it is certainly pertinent to the
evaluation of the MDT; and it is very useful to be able to examine (B)'s
implications for the MDT without being tarred with the premise itself.
Together, the MDT and (B) entail that no international legal
human rights are morally justified. After all, even without puzzling
over the manifold variety of justificatory relations permitted by the
MDT, each of them patently presupposes the existence of some moral
human right or other, in relation to which the international legal
human right being evaluated can be justified. If there simply are no
moral human rights, then the necessary condition the MDT lays down
can never be satisfied. What (B) affirms is precisely that antecedent.

76.

JEREMY BENTHAM,

INTRODUCTION TO THE PRINCIPLES OF MORALS AND

LEGISLATION (Batoche Books 2000) (1789) [hereinafter BENTHAM, PRINCIPLE OF MORALS
AND LEGISLATION].
See, e.g., H.L.A. HART, ESSAYS ON BENTHAM: JURISPRUDENCE AND POLITICAL
77.

PHILOSOPHY 79 (Oxford Univ. Press 1982).
78.

3 JEREMY BENTHAM, THE WORKS OF JEREMY BENTHAM 221 (John Bowring

ed., 1843).
Id. at 334-35.
79.
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Now, despite his hostility to moral rights, Bentham himself did
not deny for a minute that legal rights could be morally evaluated. In
his view, some were justified, while others were not. It all depended on
a detailed analysis of the facts, backed by the assiduous application of
his Greatest Happiness Principle. Indeed, this was a project to which
he devoted a good part of his remarkable energy.8 0 There is no reason
to think that international legal rights-including legal rights ascribed
to every individual (thus, international legal human rights)-are
excluded from the scope of this project or that the range of outcomes
would be any different (some justified, others not).
This Article's first argument treats the conclusion that no
international legal human rights are morally justified as a reductio of
the MDT. It does not require that one accepts (B) or that one agrees
with Bentham's evaluation of this or that (international) legal right.
All it requires is that one accept the coherence of Bentham's basic
project of morally evaluating legal rights-focusing, in this case, on
international legal human rights-the coherence, that is, of evaluating
them in utilitarian terms, against the background of (B). For the MDT
entails that Bentham's project is actually incoherent, insofar as the
evaluative outcomes are guaranteed ab initio to be negative (making
them pointless to investigate, let alone to investigate case by case). If
this verdict seems too strong, then the MDT must go.
The force of this Benthamite argument is to highlight the
extraordinary strength of the conceptual constraint that the MDT
imposes on the justification of international legal human rights.
However, the MDT can also be rejected without entertaining (B), and
even while denying it. The MDT can also be rejected, that is, while
affirming that moral human rights exist. This is fortunate, of course,
since moral human rights do exist.
Like its eponymous inspiration, then, the Benthamite argument
is perhaps a little provocative. To that extent, this Article may have
courted gratuitous danger just by trotting it out, somewhat akin to
waving a red herring in front of a bull. But the crux of the matter is not
whether moral human rights exist. It is rather whether the
justification of every justified international legal human right must be
anchored somehow in some moral human right.
Tasioulas's distinction between moral rights and human
interests is a convenient place to begin to see why the answer to this
question is negative. 81 Tasioulas locates the relevance of this
distinction in the fact that moral rights, but not mere interests, are

80.

See, e.g., BENTHAM, PRINCIPLES OF MORALS AND LEGISLATION, supra note 76.

81.
In fact, it may well be that Tasioulas's appeal to this distinction should itself
be understood as an objection to Bentham and his successors.
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necessarily associated with moral obligations.82 He then proceeds to
enumerate four features of obligations in this context: obligations are
categorical; they are weighty; failure to comply with them is wrongful;
and they are directed.8 3 For the purposes of this Article, the second
and fourth features are the most significant.
Obligations are weighty insofar as they are "robustly resistant to
being defeated by, or 'traded-off against, other considerations,
84
Most of the time,
including other obligations," as Tasioulas puts it.

in other words, a moral obligation will prevail in any conflict with other
moral considerations, so that the action it requires will also wind up
being what the agent is morally required to do, all things considered.
It is this feature of moral obligations that makes them well suited to
justifying legal rights. For legal rights are also necessarily correlated
with obligations-specifically, with legal obligations. 85 Hence they,
too, are weighty. Although hardly an unassailable axiom, it is at least
a reasonable conjecture that a weighty input is required to justify a
weighty output.8 6 That is presumably the basis of Tasioulas's scanting

of mere interests as justificatory grounds for legal rights. Unlike moral
obligations, mere interests are not guaranteed to be weighty in
themselves. While Bentham would protest, this Article will accept the
following restriction on the justification of legal rights:
(R) no legal right can be justified unless its correlative legal obligation gives
effect to some moral obligation.

The formulation of (R) is meant to reflect the fact that the
considerations on which it rests-the weightiness of moral obligations
together with the reasonable conjecture-are not confined to human
rights, but apply more generally.
The "directedness" of an obligation refers implicitly to the fact that
some obligations are owed to specific individuals (as the performance
of a promise is owed to the promisee), while other obligations are not
owed to anyone (Tasioulas's examples are obligations of charity and
mercy).8 7 Directed obligations are owed to someone and nondirected
obligations are not owed to anyone. With yet other obligations, it is
controversial or unclear whether they are directed or not (e.g., the

82.
See supra Part V.
83. Tasioulas, Saving Human Rights, supra note 1, at 1180-81. The third feature
is arguably entailed by the fourth, as Tasioulas himself seems to accept by the end of
this stretch of text.
84.
Id. at 1180.
85.
Wesley Newcomb Hohfeld, Some FundamentalLegal Conceptions as Applied
in JudicialReasoning, 23 YALE L.J. 16, 32 (1913).
86.
Here we brush up against a complicated philosophical question to do with the
scope of permissible aggregation. This is the moral equivalent of asking, can some
number of very small rocks be combined to offset a boulder? The conjecture in the text
imposes a limit on aggregation.
Gopal Sreenivasan, Duties and Their Direction, 120 ETHICS 465 (2010).
87.
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state's obligation to supply this or that pure public good). 8 8 To resolve
these controversial cases, one has to fall back on a theory of what
accounts for the direction of a directed obligation. As Tasioulas says,
this is a "difficult question."8 9
Viewed aright, all the materials needed to settle the question of
whether to accept the MDT are now in hand.9 0 As a reminder, this
thesis holds that
(MDT) it is a necessary condition on the moral justification of a given
international legal human right that it be suitably related to some moral human
right.

The crucial point to observe is that the MDTs necessary condition
anchors the justification of international legal human rights in moral
human rights. By contrast, (R)'s necessary condition is denominated in
terms of moral obligations. However apparently innocent, this small
difference is actually the loose yarn at the end of which lies the
sweater's demise.
Moral rights are necessarily correlated with moral obligations.
More specifically, moral rights correlate with directed moral
obligations, a crucial detail Tasioulas explicitly accepts.9 1 Indeed, this
more specific correlation affords one way to describe the person to
whom a directed obligation is owed, namely, as the holder of the
correlative right.92 The trouble for the MDT begins from the fact that
the directedness of moral obligations is a different feature of moral
obligations from their weightiness. That is to say, the feature of moral
obligations that associates them with moral rights is a different feature
from the feature that grounds the suitability of moral obligations to
justify legal rights and on which (R) rests in part. Since they are
different features, there is room for them to come apart.
It is not that this room leads to any difficulty in a moral human
right's satisfying either (R)'s necessary condition or the grounds for it.
There is no difficulty there. The moral obligation correlative to a moral
human right is both directed and weighty, just as Tasioulas's
enumeration suggests. Hence, whenever a moral human right's
correlative obligation is given legal effect by some international legal

88.
Tasioulas and I disagree about whether the obligation to supply a pure public
good can be directed. He thinks it can be, whereas I think it cannot be. See Gopal
Sreenivasan, Public Goods, Individual Rights, and Third-PartyBenefits, in NEW ESSAYS
ON THE NATURE OF RIGHTS 127-48 (Mark McBride ed., 2017).
89.
Tasioulas, Saving Human Rights, supra note 1, at 1181.
90.
This question has become our surrogate for asking: whether the FAT?
91. Tasioulas, Saving Human Rights, supra note 1, at 1181.
92. This fact does not itself help us to identify the relevant person. One can know
that two descriptions are equivalent without knowing who fills the role they both
describe.
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human right, that moral right satisfies both (R)'s necessary condition
and the grounds for it."
Rather, the difficulty arises because nondirectedmoral obligations
are also weighty. This is a trivial consequence of the fact that
nondirected moral obligations are, precisely, obligations. Hence,
whenever a nondirected moral obligation is given legal effect by some
international legal human right, it too will satisfy both (R)'s necessary
condition and the grounds for it. However, since nondirected moral
obligations do not correlate with moral rights-and, a fortiori, do not
correlate with moral human rights-they can never satisfy the MDT's
necessary condition.
What this brings out is that the MDT is actually more restrictive
than (R), despite the fact that (R) is meant to explain and justify the
MDT. Thus, nondirected moral obligations can satisfy the grounds for
the MDT's necessary condition-because they are weighty and so
satisfy (R)'s necessary condition-while nevertheless failing to satisfy
the MDT's necessary condition. It follows that the MDT is more
restrictive than has been justified so far-more restrictive, certainly,
than can be justified by appealing to the weightiness of moral
obligations. At this point, the sweater has come at least half unraveled.
Now, in principle, the most intuitive response to this objection
would be to try to solder the two critical features of moral obligations
together somehow, since their coming apart is the origin of the
difficulty for the MDT here. 94 Executing this response requires a deep
dive into what accounts for the direction of a directed obligation-a
"difficult" question, as Tasioulas admits.9 5 Worse, what the saviour of
the MDT needs is not any old solution to this puzzle, but a solution on
which the direction of an obligation is grounded in its weight. It is fair
to say, however, that the prospects for this sort of solution are entirely
bleak. On none of the major theories-and none of the minor ones
either, for that matter-is the direction of a directed obligation

Any moral human right that is given legal effect by some international legal
93.
human right also satisfies the MDT's necessary condition in relation to that legal right.
Thus, whenever a moral human right satisfies the MDT's necessary condition, it also
satisfies (R)'s necessary condition.
There is another promising response to this objection, but it is not available
94.
to Tasioulas, since he rejects political accounts of human rights. See supra note 34.
Someone else might concede that the special weight of obligations correlative to moral
human rights has nothing to do with their directedness (and hence, nothing to do with
moral rights generically), while insisting that these obligations do have a special weight
and that it is due instead to the distinctive function of human rights (e.g., as limiting the
exercise of state sovereignty). In that case, it would make perfect sense for the MDT to
be more restrictive than (R). See Buchanan & Sreenivasan, supra note 5, 216-18
(discussing this reply and explaining why it does not work).
Tasioulas, Saving Human Rights, supra note 1, at 1181.
95.
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grounded in its weight.96 The weight of a moral obligation appears to
be simply irrelevant to its directedness.
It may be instructive to consider Joseph Raz's theory briefly, as a
case in point, since his solution is probably the closest of those already
in the literature to what defenders of the MDT require. According to
Raz, and simplifying a little, X holds a right correlative to Ys obligation
just in case X's interest is, other things equal, sufficient to justify
imposing that obligation on Y. 97 What accounts for Ys obligation being
owed to X, on this solution, is the fact that X's interest (an aspect of his
or her well-being) plays a significant justificatory role in Y's being
under that obligation.
Raz's solution is close to what defenders of the MDT require
insofar as the conditions under which Ys obligation has a direction
here can be plausibly redescribed in terms that refer to the weight of
Ys obligation. To wit, the weight of X's interest must be commensurate
with the weight of Ys obligation, as a condition of the former's being
sufficient (other things equal) to justify the latter. In other words, at
least implicitly, the weight of Ys obligation does at least figure in the
conditions under which Raz declares that Ys obligation has a direction.
But that, alas, is as close as it gets. Nothing in Raz's criterion
implies anything about how weighty Ys moral obligation is. A fortiori,
nothing is implied about whether Ys moral obligation is notably
weighty (and so, especially conducive to justifying an international
legal human right). Instead, Raz's criterion takes the weight of Ys
moral obligation as given. Its weight is what it is. So far from being
regulated by his criterion, the magnitude of this weight is rather
deployed as a target for something else: Once given the weight of Ys
moral obligation, Raz requires that X's interest have a commensurate
weight, as a condition of X's qualifying as the person to whom Ys
obligation is owed. None of this, then, offers any succour to the MDT.
A tidy illustration and summary of the essentials can be found in
the aforementioned controversy about whether individuals can hold
rights correlative to obligations to supply some pure public good (PPG).
Suppose the state has a moral obligation to supply some PPG. Let the
weight of this obligation be whatever it may be. Suppose, furthermore,
that this same public good falls within the scope of some international
legal human right, the right to Z. 98 The right to Z therefore gives
international legal effect to the state's moral obligation to supply PPG.

96.
For an overview, complete with vindication of the claim in the text, see
Sreenivasan, supra note 87, at 465-94.
97.
JOSEPH RAZ, THE MORALITY OF FREEDOM 1, 166 (Oxford Univ. Press 1986).
98.
The right to Z does not have to be a right to PPG directly. Recall the objections
to the NMV's correspondence requirement. It is enough, for example, if PPG makes an
important instrumental contribution to the realization of Z, whatever Z might be.
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What follows? The state's moral obligation is either directed or it is
nondirected. Yet either way, it has the generic weightiness of an
obligation. Hence, the international legal human right to Z satisfies
(R). For exactly the same reason, it also satisfies the grounds of the
MDT's necessary condition.
But does it satisfy the MDT itself? That depends on whether
individuals hold moral (human) rights correlative to the state's moral
obligation to supply PPG.99 Say Tasioulas is correct and individuals
(can and) do have moral rights to public goods, including to PPG.
Then the international legal human right to Z does satisfy the MDT.
However, even if all of this is true, it does not change the weight of the
state's moral obligation to supply PPG one whit. Consequently, it adds
100
It is therefore
nothing to the moral justification of the right to Z.
arbitrary and unjustified to insist on a correlative moral right here, as
a necessary condition-but effectively, an empty one-of the moral
justification of the international legal human right to Z. Since that is
precisely what the MDT does, the MDT should be rejected. All that is
left now is a pile of yarn.

VIII. CONCLUSION
This Article's concern has been with Tasioulas's analysis of
international human rights law. One focus of discussion has been cases
of pure human rights inflation, illustrated by Tasioulas's example of
the international legal human right to annual paid leave. What makes
an international legal human right a case of pure inflation is that it
does not give effect to any moral human right. Tasioulas maintains
that such cases are not morally justified. His argument for this
conclusion tacitly relies upon what this Article has called the moral
dependence thesis. This thesis holds that it is a necessary condition on
the moral justification of a given international legal human right that
it be suitably related to some moral human right.
This Article has argued against the moral dependence thesis.
However, this is not to defend the international legal human right to
annual paid leave or any other case of pure rights inflation. The point
is only that cases of pure rights inflation are not automatically
excluded from being morally justified, simply because they have no
footprint in any moral human right. While moral human rights can

For simplicity, I ignore the complications in what follows that would attend
99.
respecting the difference between moral rights and moral human rights. They do not
affect anything of importance for present purposes.
100. A parallel analysis applies to the opposite case, where individuals do not hold
moral rights to PPG. In that case, the international legal human right to Z fails to satisfy
the MDT. But this does not change the weight of the state's moral obligation to supply
PPG at all either. Consequently, it subtracts nothing from the moral justification of the
right to Z.
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certainly be relevant to the enterprise, the moral evaluation of
international legal human rights is nevertheless substantially
independent of moral human rights. Some cases of pure human rights
inflation may thus be perfectly morally justified, even if other cases are
not. To decide which cases are which, there is no substitute for a
detailed case-by-case analysis. On that score, anyhow, Bentham had it
exactly right.
Tasioulas's negative moral evaluation of pure human rights
inflation begins by describing such cases as deviations from the
formative aim of international human rights law. According to his
formative aim thesis, international human rights law primarily aims
to give effect to moral human rights (insofar as it is appropriate for
international law to do so, through the technique of assigning a
uniform set of individual legal rights to all humans). In Tasioulas's
analysis, the normative role of the formative aim thesis is to license
moral evaluations of international human rights law.
By rejecting the moral dependence thesis, this Article has revoked
the licence for his negative evaluation of pure human rights inflation.
However, it also accepted (for the sake of argument) that the formative
aim thesis correctly describes the practice of human rights. This means
that cases of pure inflation still count, descriptively, as deviations (i.e.,
as evaluatively neutral "deviations"). If the formative aim thesis can
be given a suitable normative backing, it might yet be able to license
(negative) moral evaluation of the other "deviations" Tasioulas has
described, such as the overjudicialisation of moral human rights. That
remains to be seen.

